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Podberesky, Hopwood, and Adarand:
Implications for the Future
of Race-Based Programs
LINO A. GRAGLIA*

My task is to assess the implications of the Podberesky' and
Hopwood2 decisions for the future of race-based preference programs, that
is, the future of "affirmative action." Podberesky involved a challenge to a
lush financial aid scholarship program at the University of Maryland for
which only blacks were eligible. The university adopted the program under
pressure from the Office of Civil Rights of the Department of Education to
"desegregate" the university by taking steps to increase black enrollment.
Segregation, of course, ended long ago at the University of Maryland, but
to professional civil rights enforcers, "desegregation" has long meant
compulsory integration. Purporting to enforce Title VI of the 1964 Civil
Rights Act, 3 which prohibits racial discrimination by institutions that
receive federal funds, the Office of Civil Rights insists, with the aid and
support of federal courts and the Department of Justice, that such institutions
practice racial discrimination. I mention this in passing because it is the
source of the racial conflicts on our campuses and elsewhere that are
threatening to tear our society apart.
In Podberesky, Federal District Judge J. Frederick Motz--a Reagan
appointee, I am sad and embarrassed to say--had no difficulty in upholding
the scholarship program as a means to remedy the effects of past
discrimination. Black enrollment at the University of Maryland was as high
as sixteen percent, but Judge Motz, on the basis of his educational expertise,
thought it was still too low. Judge Motz, at least as gullible as he was
self-righteous, had no difficulty believing that the reason that there are not
* B.A., CCNY; LL.B., Columbia Law School; A. Dalton Cross Professor of Law,
University of Texas.
1. Podberesky v. Kirwan, 764 F. Supp. 364 (D. Md. 1991), rev'd and remanded, 956
F.2d 52 (4th Cir. 1992), on remand, 838 F. Supp. 1075 (D. Md. 1993), vacated and
remanded, 38 F.3d 147 (4th Cir. 1994) (en banc), reh'g denied, 46 F.3d 5 (4th Cir. 1994),
and cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 2001 (1995).
2. Hopwood v. State of Texas, 861 F. Supp. 551 (W.D. Texas 1994), rev'd and
remanded, Nos. 94-50569, 94-50664, 1996 WL 120235 (5th Cir. 1996).
3. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d-2000d5 (1988).
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more black students at the University of Maryland is that it has a "poor
reputation" among blacks, and the reason so many black students drop out
of law school is the existence of "a hostile racial attitude on campus"--after
all, how else could low black enrollment and retention be explained?
A Fourth Circuit panel made up of Judge Emory Widener, a Nixon
appointee, and Judges William Wilkens and Clyde Hamilton, Reagan
appointees, took a very different view of the matter.4 The university came
before the court, Judge Widener wrote for a unanimous panel, with a
presumption that its race-based program cannot be sustained. The court
rejected the "poor reputation" and "hostile racial climate" claims out of hand
as insufficient to support racial preferences. It rejected the district judge's
finding that blacks were "underrepresented" at the university as based on an
improper comparison, and doubted that there was any underrepresentation
needing remedy.
The truth, of course, is that blacks are not underrepresented, but greatly
overrepresented at institutions of higher education once IQ scores are taken
into account. "After controlling for IQ," Hernstein and Murray point out,
"larger numbers of whites than blacks graduate from college and enter the
professions. '5 With an IQ in this range, a black applicant's chances of
getting into an institution of higher education are about ten times better than
a white applicant's.
The Fourth Circuit rejected the race-based program on every ground.
It found that the program had not been shown either to meet any compelling
need or to be narrowly tailored to any such need. On the narrow tailoring
issue, the court noted, for example, that most of the recipients of the
scholarships came from outside Maryland, making it difficult to see how the
program could be justified as a remedy for supposed injuries to Maryland
residents. This is a point of general importance. The University of Texas
Law School's "affirmative action" program is also largely filled with
out-of-state black students. Such programs simply bid black students away
from other states in order to fill racial quotas in the bidding state. The
Fourth Circuit ordered that the scholarship program be made available to all
applicants without regard to race. The Supreme Court denied certiorari.
Hopwood v. Texas 6 is a challenge to the admission practices of the
University of Texas Law School by rejected white applicants who would
have been automatically admitted had they been of a preferred race: that is,

4. Podberesky v. Kirwan, 38 F.3d 147 (4th Cir. 1994).
5. RICHARD S. HERNSTEIN AND CHARLES MURRAY, THE BELL CURVE 317 (1994).
6. Hopwood v. State of Texas, 861 F. Supp. 551 (W.D. Texas 1994), rev'd and
remanded, Nos. 94-50569, 94-50664, 1996 WL 120235 (5th Cir. 1996).
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THE FUTURE OF RACE-BASED PROGRAMS

black or Mexican-American. In the 1978 Bakke7 case, four justices said
that Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act prohibits discrimination against
whites equally with discrimination against blacks, four justices said it did
not, and Justice Powell broke the tie by deciding to have it both ways. He
said in effect, discrimination against whites is prohibited by Title VI and the
Constitution every bit as much as discrimination against blacks, except that
just a little bit of it would be acceptable. Setting aside a number of seats
exclusively for blacks is therefore prohibited--every applicant for admission
to a school must compete with every other applicant--but using an
applicant's minority race as a "plus factor," along with many other factors,
in order to "tip the balance" in close cases was permissible.
This, of course, was little more than an invitation to fraud. Powell
included in his opinion a table showing the huge gap in qualifications that
existed between the specially admitted and the regularly admitted students
at the University of California at Davis Medical School. In 1973, for
example, an average MCAT score for regularly admitted students was at the
seventy-sixth percentile, while for specially admitted students it was at the
twenty-forth. It was obvious that no question of tipping the balance in close
cases was involved in what the school was doing.
The reason "affirmative action" programs exist in higher education, as
Powell's table showed--the inability of blacks and Mexican-Americans to
compete academically with whites and others--is also the reason the
programs cannot possibly be expected to succeed. At Berkeley, to take
another example, the median combined SAT score for blacks is 288 points
lower than the score for whites, a difference in academic preparation of
about four and one-half years. The difference between the blacks and the
Asian students was even larger. What can admitting a racially identifiable
group of students not in the same academic ballpark as other students be
expected to produce except frustration, humiliation, and resentment?
Inability to play the game being played necessarily results in demands that
the game be changed, and thus are born demands for black studies and
multiculturalism. Nothing could be more discomfiting than an open and
specific discussion of a school's racially preferential admissions policies, and
thus are born "hate speech" codes, sensitivity training requirements, and
insistence on political correctness.
Bakke's invitation to fraud was, of course, gratefully and eagerly
accepted by the highly moral seekers of a more just society, that is to say
liberals, who constitute academia. This was certainly true at the University
of Texas Law School, where the faculty saw no need to make even a

7. Regents of University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
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pretense of complying with the Bakke limitations. The law school simply
created a separate minority admissions committee to pass on applications from
blacks and Mexican-Americans, and to grant them admission until the desired
numbers were reached. Instead of all applicants being made to compete, the
school set automatic admission scores for blacks and Mexican-Americans that
were lower than the automatic rejection score for whites.
The Hopwood case was heard by federal district judge Sam Sparks, a
Democrat sponsored by Senator Phil Gramm and appointed by President Bush.
He is, along with Judge Motz in Maryland and many others, a living
testimonial to Republican incompetence in the selection of judges and to the
havoc wreaked on the country as a result. Judge Sparks is a graduate of the
University of Texas Law School, he lives and works in Austin, and has
University of Texas Law School faculty members as close friends. The
unfortunate Hopwood plaintiffs could have hardly drawn a less favorable
arbiter.
Judge Sparks held, as he had to, that the Law School had indeed violated
the plaintiffs' constitutional and statutory rights. He could hardly restrain
himself, nonetheless, in his expressions of admiration and approval for what
the Law School had done and which he in effect authorized it to continue to
do. He declined to order plaintiffs admitted or to give them money damages
or any other substantial relief. The Law School, he explained, did not intend
to violate the plaintiffs' rights--apparently he thought the faculty discriminated
against them by accident. Or maybe he merely meant that the well-intentioned
but unsophisticated law faculty--including some of the nation's leading
authorities on constitutional law--just didn't understand the law.
The University of Texas Law School represented to the judge that it had
changed its admissions practices during the Hopwood litigation. It had
abolished the separate special admissions committee, it said, and would
thenceforth process all applications through a single committee. This was
enough to convince Judge Sparks that the Law School had mended its ways,
and would cease its constitutional and statutory derelictions without need of
further restriction or guidance from him. The judge purported to believe that
thereafter all applicants would compete with one another and that race would
be used only to tip the balance in close cases. However, he also explicitly and
enthusiastically approved of the Law School's determination to make each
entering class approximately ten percent Mexican-American and five percent
black, even though there is no way that can be done, as he had to know, if
black and Mexican-American applicants have to compete with white
applicants. The quotas he approved, that is, can only be achieved, as they will
be, by precisely the practices he purported to condemn.
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What are the implications of these decisions for "affirmative action?"
The clearest meaning of Podberesky, I'm tempted to say, is that you had
better not try to defend racial preferences before that particular panel of the
Fourth Circuit. I know Emory Widener; he was a visiting professor at the
University of Texas, and he is an exceptionally able judge. Unfortunately,
there are not many judges that strong; the federal bench is full of Motzes
and Sparkses and Souters. Law plays no part in these race preference
decisions, as a comparison of Widener's opinion with Motz's and Sparks's
opinions should make clear. Everything depends on the judge and will
continue to be this way until the Supreme Court renders a definitive opinion
or, better, a series of definitive opinions, one way or the other. All we can
say for sure about Podberesky is that if other judges approached attempts to
justify racial discrimination with the same skepticism, realism, and honesty
as Widener, the era of racially discriminatory programs would be over.
That, however, is more than can be expected of judges who, like Motz and
Sparks, believe that judicial appointment authorizes them to advance their
notions of social progress and are willing to make whatever fanciful factual
findings that entails.
The effect of Hopwood depends, of course, on what happens on appeal.
Its affirmance would mean that schools can continue to play the Bakke charade
with even greater impunity, free of all concern about a successful legal
challenge. I think there is a good chance, however, better than even, that
Sparks will be reversed by the Fifth Circuit--if I could pick the panel, I could
guarantee it--and that the reversal will be sustained by the Supreme Court.'
The Fifth Circuit is not authorized, unfortunately, to reverse Bakke and
restore Title VI, that is, to simply rule that all racial discrimination is
prohibited. It might, however, tell the University of Texas that it must take
Bakke seriously, end race-norming, and require all applicants to compete.
That, too, would be the end of "affirmative action," if it were followed. But
it will not be followed; as long as schools are permitted to use race at all,
they will find ways to make race determinative, because there is no other
way to admit large numbers of blacks.

8. See Hopwood v. State of Texas, Nos. 94-50569, 94-50664, 1996 WL 120235 (5th
Cir. 1996) (reversing and remanding). The decision was issued subsequent to writing this
essay. In effect, the Fifth Circuit did reverse Bakke as it was commonly understood, holding
that "diversity" was not a "compelling interest" justifying the use of racial preferences. The
court correctly pointed out that the diversity rationale had never been acceptance by any
Justice other than Powell and that later decisions seem to make clear that remedying past
discrimination--but only by the particular governmental unit involved--is the only interest that

can be considered compelling.
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This brings me to what may be the most important piece of our puzzle,
the Supreme Court's decision in Adarand v. Pehia.9 The Court reversed the
lower court decisions upholding a federal race-based set-aside program in
public contracting on the ground that the lower courts applied an incorrect
legal standard. Explicitly overruling Metro Broadcasting, Inc. v. Federal
Communications Commission,10 Justice Brennan's last contribution to the
nation's welfare, the Court held, though only by a bare five-to-four majority,
that the "strict scrutiny" test applies to federal as well as to state race-based
programs. In a sense, the question the Fifth Circuit will have to decide in
Hopwood is: "What is the message of Adarand?" Adarand is bad news for
racial preferences, but how bad is hard to say.
We now know that federal as well as state race-based programs require
a showing of a "compelling interest," but "compelling" is, even more than
beauty, in the eye of the beholder. On the one hand, the Court, in an
opinion by Justice O'Connor, declined to overrule Fullilove v. Klutznick,"
which upheld an extremely questionable federal set-aside program, and
refused to enter judgment for the discriminated-against plaintiff-contractor.
Instead, the Court merely remanded the case for reconsideration under the
correct standard. It also insisted that "strict scrutiny" does not mean "strict
in theory, fatal in fact," and asserted that there remains plenty of racial
discrimination and its effects still to be "remedied." As a result, Justice
Souter was able to argue that essentially nothing had happened. He saw no
reason why the lower courts could not simply reaffirm their earlier decisions
with just a little change of language.
On the other hand, the Court repeatedly insisted that any use of racial
preferences must be treated with "skepticism" and given "a most searching
examination," and emphasized the stigma and evils resulting from
"affirmative action." Skepticism, as Podberesky shows, is the one thing
racially preferential programs cannot survive. To the extent that such
programs claim to be concerned with remedying past discrimination or with
"diversity" or anything other than race, the claim is patently false. No black
applicant has ever been refused admission to the University of Texas Law
School, for example, because he was too advantaged or too typically middle
class; it is always quite sufficient that he is black. Souter notwithstanding,
it seems safe to say that the Court did not take the case and reverse the
lower courts for no reason. The least Adarand means is that lower courts
will not be faulted for looking at race-based programs with a healthy

9. 115 S. Ct. 2097 (1995).
10. 497 U.S. 547 (1990).
.11. 448 U.S. 448 (1980).
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skepticism. If this message is understood and followed by the Fifth Circuit
in Hopwood, as I expect, it could mean the end or at least some real limits
on racially preferential admissions at the University of Texas Law School
and elsewhere.
As a final word, in my opinion the era of racial preferences is rapidly
coming to an end regardless of what happens in Hopwood. For more than
a quarter of a century, the main support and protection of "affirmative
action" programs--discrimination against whites--has been the ability of their
proponents to intimidate opponents into silence. Opponents had to live with
the knowledge and fear that they could be attacked at any moment with the
devastating charge of "racism," even though they were opposing treating
people by race. Recent developments, however, such as the California Civil
Rights Initiative and the 1992 election, have brought discussion of racial
preferences into the open and made opposition respectable. Racial
preference programs are a fungus that can thrive only in the dark, covered
by evasion and deceit; the light of open discussion and criticism is more
than they can survive. This appears to be illustrated by the just-announced
decision of the regents of the University of California to terminate racial
preferences in admission. The battle is far from over. Liberal academics can
be expected to subvert any policy they strongly oppose, but we have reason
to hope that from now on, justification of racial preferences will be an uphill
fight.

